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muertes de los civiles afganos
Marc W. Herold
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Profesor de Desarrollo Económico 
Universidad de New Hampshire en Durham (New Hampshire, EE.UU.)
Abstract
This essay explores upon two inter-related issues: (1) the course of America’s raging 
Afghan war as actually experienced on the ground as contrasted with the Pentagon and 
mainstream media narrative and (2) the unrelenting Obama/Pentagon efforts to control 
the public narrative of that war.1
As the real war on the ground spread geographically and violence intensified, U.S. efforts 
to construct a positive spin re-doubled. An examination of bodies – of foreign occupa-
tion forces and innocent Afghan civilians – reveals a clear trade-off.  NATO country 
elites understand the quagmire and have begun pulling-back.
Keywords: body trade-offs; civilian deaths caused by the US/NATO (2001-2010); 
critical analysis of Afghan civilian body counts; Pentagon means to control war 
narrative; phases of America’s war in Afghanistan.
Resumen
Este artículo investiga dos cuestiones relacionadas: (1) la experiencia sobre el terreno 
de la feroz guerra de EE.UU. en Afganistán, en contraste con el relato del Pentágono 
y los medios de comunicación dominantes; (2) los implacables esfuerzos de Obama y 
el Pentágono para controlar el relato público sobre esta guerra. Mientras la guerra real 
se extendía geográficamente y la violencia se intensificaba, se redoblaban también los 
esfuerzos de los EE.UU. para construir una lectura positiva. El examen de los cadáveres 
(de las fuerzas extranjeras de ocupación y de los civiles afganos inocentes) revela una 
situación de intercambio. Las élites de los países de los países de la OTAN han com-
prendido que se han metido en un callejón sin salida y comienzan a dar marcha atrás.
Palabras clave: intercambio de cadáveres; muertes civiles producidas por los EEUU y 
la OTAN (2001-2010); análisis crítico de las cuentas sobre muertes civiles afganos; los 
medios del Pentágono para controlar el relato bélico; fases de la guerra de los EEUU 
en Afganistán.
1. The universality of war 
propaganda is striking as a 
comparison between the 
Russian war narrative than and 
the U.S/NATO war narrative 
today reveals, details in Glenn 
Greenwald, “The Universality of 
War Propaganda. A soldier with 
the Russian army in Afghanistan 
recounts what they believed 
about their mission,” Salon.com 
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Introduction.
I believe that the end of the Afghan war will be “determined more by bodies than by 
politics or deals”. The period 2002-6 was an incubating period for the resurgence of 
the Taliban and its allies. U.S. raids on the ground transformed what had been a frag-
mented Afghan resistance into a war of national liberation, a matter I have addressed 
elsewhere in a widely reproduced essay2. The rest is history: a trend of soaring Afghan 
civilian deaths, escalating violence, local military and US/NATO occupation forces 
deaths and spreading insecurity. The following systems’ chart highlights the essential 
feedback elements at work in the America’s Afghan war:
Figure 1. Deadly Trade-offs in Afghanistan
The essential link is that America’s Afghan war causes civilian casualties which, in turn, 
fuel the Afghan resistance which, in turn, causes more U.S casualties. No link exists 
between Afghan and U.S civil societies, i.e. rising civilian casualties in America’s for-
eign wars have never caused the U.S general public to become anti-war3.  McChrystal’s 
alleged effort to reduce Afghan civilian casualties (-) was a trade-off for rising U.S mili-
tary casualties (++) as I demonstrated a year ago4. Figure 1 makes an essential point: 
the United States can pursue its war but the result will be either soaring Afghan civilian 
casualties or escalating U.S. military deaths. Whereas Gen. Stanley McChrystal opted 
for the latter, his successor clearly has chosen the former. McChrystal had pronounced 
the much ballyhooed new metric of civilian casualties5. Ackerman writes, “Since Gen. 
David Petraeus took command of the war effort in late June 2010, coalition aircraft 
have flown 2,600 attack sorties. That’s 50% more than they did during the same period 
in 2009. Not surprisingly, civilian casualties are on the rise, as well.” Thus, air strikes 
2. See “The American Occu-
pation of Afghanistan and the 
Birth of a National Liberation 
Movement,” Global Research 
(September 7, 2010) at http://
www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=20946 . 
The article is cited some 8,900 
times in a Google search (at 9:43 
AM EST on November 19, 2010).
3. As beautifully expressed in 
“The American public is con-
ditionally tolerant of [military] 
casualties and consistently 
indifferent to collateral damage,” 
Dr. Karl P. Mueller, School of 
Advanced Airpower Studies, 
Maxwell Air Force Base.
4. In “Obama’s Unspoken Trade-
Off: Dead US/NATO Occupation 
Troops versus Dead Afghan 
Civilians?” RAWA News (August 






5. See my “Obama’s Afghan 
War. The New Metric of Civilian 
Casualties,” Global Research 
(June 12, 2009) at http://www.
globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.
php?articleId=13957 
6. See Spencer Ackerman, “Spin 
War Shift: Military now Bragging 
about Afghan Air Strikes,” Wired.




casualties / ,  Noah Schactman, 
“Bombs Away: Afghan Air War 
Peaks with 1,000 Strikes in Octo-





7. Emphasis added by M.H.  
http://accuracy.org/newsrelea-
se.php?articleId=2390.   Rosen 
is author of the new book After-
math: Following the Bloodshed 
of America’s Wars in the Muslim 
World (Nation Books, 2010) 
8. The three main fallacies dri-
ving America’s Afghan war have 
been rebutted in Johann Hari, 
“The Three Fallacies That Have 
Driven the War in Afghanistan,” 
The Independent (October 
21, 2009) at http://www.
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are “in” again and the U.S. military is even brazenly bragging about them6. But such 
news is found primarily in the Blogosphere at Wired.com and not to be seen in the 
New York Times, Washington Post or on PBS/NPR. 
Everything indicates more of the same as during 2006-9. As Nir Rosen points out,
Obama has set an arbitrary deadline of 2014, but his generals are doing the same 
thing again and again and expecting different results. There is no evidence of prog-
ress on any front and every reason to believe next year in Afghanistan will be worse 
than this year. We mistakenly see Afghanistan through the prism of Iraq. But the 
‘surge’ did not reduce violence in Iraq. It was Iraqi social and political dynamics. And 
none of these elements have their Afghan equivalents. And Iraq remains more vio-
lent than Afghanistan. We spend so much time thinking about what we can do in 
Afghanistan that we ignore the question of whether we even should do it7.
I shall address neither the fallacies put out by Bush/Obama to justify the Afghan war8 
nor a host of issues analyzed by others which I take as givens providing the context for 
the raging war9. These include:
 ● warlords continue to dominate across most of Afghanistan as confirmed in recent 
elections; 
 ● Afghanistan is either the most or second-most corrupt nation in the world. Karzai’s 
brother in Kandahar is both a major drug dealer and on the CIA payroll to provide 
security. Released WikiLeaks documents reveal rampant bribery, graft, etc.10;
 ● Numerous national-level Afghan politicians are on the CIA payroll; 
 ● much of foreign aid disappears, e.g., U.S funds were used to buy 14 oceanfront villas 
on the super-luxurious Palm Jumeirah development in Dubai for wealthy Afghans11;
 ● that $76.5 billion of the $80 billion committed to Afghanistan has been spent 
on military and security and much of the remaining $3.5 billion on international 
consultants;
 ● most of the so-called reconstruction involved high-visibility glamor projects like 
highways, malls and luxury hotels; 
 ● The United States is now spending nearly half a billion dollars a year in an attempt 
to establish the “rule of law” in Afghanistan. But a new government report suggests it 
may just be that much more money down the drain12;
 ● Afghanistan ranks dead last amongst 163 countries on a food security index;
 ● Between 2004 and 2009, Afghanistan went from being 173rd out of 178 countries 
to being 181st out of 182 nations on the United Nations’ human development index13;
 ● Poverty is unimaginable – 13% of Afghans have access to clean drinking water and 
6% to toilets14;
 ● Kabul is awash with a NGO mafia15 notwithstanding that some admirable work has 
been carried by the likes of OXFAM, DACCAR, etc.;
 ● poppy and hashish cultivation continue (of course, demand creates its own supply) 
with Afghanistan being the world’s biggest producer of both16; 
 ● vapid hype about peace talks with ex-Taliban members not involved today in the 
Afghan resistance, most recently a fake Taliban who made it all the way to Karzai’s 
palace to “negotiate” underscoring how little the US/NATO know about the Taliban17;







Eric Margolis,”Lies Drive the 
Afghan War,” Huffington Post 




9. A superb analysis of many 
of these is made in William 
R. Polk, “Elements of a U.S. 
Strategy toward Afghanistan,” 





10. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “Wiki-
Leaks: Bribery, Graft Rampant 
in Afghanistan,” Associated 




Scott Share, Mark Mazetti and 
Dexter Filkins, “Cables Describe 
Scale of Afghan Corruption as 
Overwhelming,” New York Times 
(December 3, 2010).
11. Susanne Koelbl, “U.S. Funds 
Used to Buy Villas for wealthy 




story?id=11093986 .also Richard 
Spencer, James Kirkup and 
Damien McElroy, “The Karzai 
Empire, Villas in Dubai and 
Fears over Afghan Aid,” The Daily 






12. Robert Dreyfuss, “Afghan 
Farce: ‘Taliban’ Talker was 
Phony” at http://www.uruknet.
fo/?p=m72099&hd=&size=1&l=e 
and  Dan Froomkin, “Massive 
U.S. Spending on ‘Rule of Law’ 
in Afghanistan not Paying Off,” 





13. These last two indicators 
are taken from Nick Turse, “How 
Much ‘Success’ Can Afghans 
Stand?” Tomdispatch.com (Sept-
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 ● dire poverty amidst ostentatious wealth (villas in Kabul and on the Dubai coast) as 
Afghan people suffer under a powerful elite tied to Karzai and the U.S19; 
 ● Karzai was a puppet from day one and continues to be notwithstanding his periodic 
outbursts;
 ● Afghanistan ranks worst in gender inequality amongst 25 Asia Pacific nations20; 
 ● civilians slaughtered by US/NATO are magically transformed into “insurgents”; 
 ● The AP, NYT, Washington Post, NPR and PBS continue to serve as mouthpieces 
of Obama’s Pentagon; 
 ● the pitiful state and utter unreliability of the Afghan National Police21 which is 
thoroughly infiltrated by the Taliban and much of the Afghan National Army22 
(exactly a replay of the South Vietnamese militaries when Nixon began his doomed 
Vietnamization strategy in 1970 with a significantly better South Vietnamese puppet 
army and the inability of the Afghan Army to recruit southern Pashtuns) AN OXFAM 
report compiled by Rebecca Barber described now Afghan police and army commit 
crimes such as child abuse, torture and killings with impunity23;
 ● U.S and NATO forces rely upon local war lords’ private militias to provide security24; 
 ● a largely stalled reconstruction effort as a result of de facto Taliban control of 70-80% 
of Afghanistan where they collect taxes, enforce sharia, provide security, etc.; 
 ● periodic pleas for and/or reports about “flipping the Taliban” (Michael Semple, 
now at the Carr Institute - a flagship of the humanitarian imperialists - pushes that) 
will never work as it is now a war of national liberation (against US/NATO and its 
Quisling in Kabul;
 ● and trying to establish a strong, central government in Afghanistan which is a fool’s 
errand25.
The following analysis is divided into two major sections: a first one which the real 
war on the ground in Afghanistan during 2004-10; and a second part which critically 
documents the Obama/Pentagon efforts to control the public narrative of America’s 
Afghan war.




14. See my “An Excess of 
Corruption and a Deficit of 
Toilets: American and Karzai’s 
‘Successes’ in Afghanistan,” RAWA 






15. See Walter Mayr, “Exotic 
Birds in a Cage. Criticism Grows 
of Afghanistan’s Bloated NGO 
Industry,” Der Spiegel Online 
(September 22, 2010) at http://
www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,718656,00.html 
16. “Afghanistan is World’s 
Largest Hashish Producer, UN 
Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur 
(March 31, 2010 at 10.18 GMT) 
and Chris Hedges, “Opium, Rape 
and the American Way,” Truthdig 
(November 2, 2009) at http://
www.commondreams.org/
view/2009/11/02 
17. Matthew Rosenberg and 
Adam Entous, “Sign of War Gains 
Prove False,” Wall Street Journal 





18. Hafuz Ahmad and Amir Khil, 
“Commentary: Afghans Disillu-
sioned by Electoral Politics,” Insti-
tute for War & Peace Reporting 
(July 22, 2010) and Malalai Joya, 
“Why Afghans Have No Hope in 
This Week’s Elections,” Common-
Dreams.org (August 18, 2009) at  
http://www.commondreams.
org/view/2009/08/18-10          
19. Jonathan S. Landay, “Factory, 
Coal Mine Show Connections 
Matter Most in Afghan Business,” 
McClatchy Newspapers (Novem-




html. See also Patrick Cockburn, 
“Kabul’s New Elite Live High 
on Western Largesse; ‘Gilded 
Cage’ Lifestyle Reveals the Ugly 
Truth about Foreign Aid in 
Afghanistan,” The Independent 




20. Abdul Qadir Siddique, “Gender 
Inequality Worst in Afghanistan: UN,” 
Pahjwok Afghan News (April 11, 2010) 
and Christina Lamb, “The Defiant Poets’ 
Society,” The Sunday Times (April 26, 
2009) at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/asia/article6149248.ece 
21. See Andreas Ulrich and Alfred 
Weinzieri, “Illiterate, Corrupt and Trigger-
Happy. German Trainers Describe Pitiful 
State of Afghan Police,” Der Spiegel (April 
7, 2010) at http://www.spiegel.de/inter-
national/world/0,1518,687416,00.html 
22. Ann Jones, “There’s Virtually Zero 
Percent Chance of There Ever Being 
a Real Afghan Army – So what’s the 
Pentagon Thinking About?” Alter-






23. ”Afghan Police Committing Crimes 
with Impunity,” Pajhwok Afghan News 
(May 10, 2011) at http://www.pajhwok.
com/en/2011/05/10/afghan-police-
committing-crimes-impunity-oxfam 
24. Detailed in Gareth Porter, “U.S. NATO 
Forces Rely on Warlords for Security,” 




25. as cogently argued by Melvin A. 
Goodwin who spent 42 years with 
the CIA, the National War College, and 
the U.S. Army, in his “WPost Misleads 
on Afghan History,” Consortiumnews.
com (October 28, 2009) at http://www.
consortiumnews.com/2009/102809a.
html  and “Five Myths on Afghanistan,” 
Truthout.org (October 8, 2009) at http://
www.truth-out.org/10080910 
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The Course of the Real War on the Afghan Ground (Zero)
“I was still holding my grandson’s hand – the rest was gone.”
What a U.S Air Force “precision” strike turned yet 
another Afghan wedding into on July 6, 200826
This section traces four phases in America’s Afghan war, then documents the soaring 
civilian impact deaths as of 2006 (Table 1). A critical analysis and contrast is then made 
of the various Afghan “body counts” (Table 2). The increasing reliance upon killing 
vehicles which are out of public sight – night raids by secretive JSOC troops and drone 
warfare – involving minimal U.S casualties is the latest phase. Obama’s two generals 
in Afghanistan - McChrystal and Petraeus - built a deadly and indiscriminate “killing 
machine” involving CIA and JSOC Special Forces teams27.
The American war in Afghanistan after the first three years (2001-3) has followed a 
demonstrable sequence:
Time period U.S. offensive thrust Resulted in problem of
2004-6 Recruit NATO troops Growing Taliban success
2006-8 Heavy reliance upon air strikes NATO criticism of civilian deaths
2009 Obama/McChrystal shift to fewer air strikes, more 
ground attacks
Rising U.S military casualties
2010 In face of Taliban successes, Obama/Petraeus shift 
back to air war, drones  and Special Forces/CIA night 
raids
Rising civilian deaths
As the war dragged on foreign forces’ stated goals were scaled back, e.g., from building 
a democratic nation-building so dear to the humanitarian imperialists to buying time 
while Afghan police and army forces can be trained sufficiently for the US/NATO 
to exit. Foreign occupation forces have employed variants of sheer military force and 
counterinsurgency “win the hearts and minds” tactics. U.S/NATO tactics shifted from 
setting up forward operating bases in remote areas to shifting back to merely protecting 
cities and from reliance upon air strikes to favoring attacks by ground forces28.  The 
US/NATO forces in 2008-9 had finally been forced to concede that civilian casualties 
were fuelling the Afghan resistance which led to a change of generals from McKiernan 
to McChrystal. “General McChrystal says that for every innocent person you kill, you 
create 10 new enemies”29. A recent study by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) found that each time U.S/NATO forces “accidentally” killed Afghan civilians, 
the resistance forces retaliated with six additional attacks upon foreign forces30. 
But it goes way beyond mere wounding and killing. The resistance is strengthened by the 
knocking down doors of a home at midnight31, entering homes, pulling Afghan women 
be their hair, abductions and beatings, desecration of the Koran32, wanton shootings 
at checkpoints33, and simple everyday incidents of western arrogance and insensitivity. 
A lesser level of Afghan resistance is displayed by NATO’s slick weekly being primar-
ily used in Kabul as food wrapping. The fortnightly Sada-e Azad – Voice of Freedom 
newspaper packed full of pro-NATO propaganda is put out by German psychological 
operations taskforce at NATO’s Kabul headquarters and costs 400,000 British pounds 
to produce 800,000 copies34.
26. See my “Another Wedding 
Party Massacre: 47 Afghan 
Civilians Killed, including the 
bride, 8 persons aged 14 to 
18, 38 women and children,” 
Afghan Victim Memorial Project 




27. Details in Gareth Porter, 
“How McChrystal and Petraeus 
Built an Indiscriminate ‘Killing 
Machine’,” IPS News (September 




28. Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Com-
manders Told to Shift Focus 
to More Populated Areas,” 
Washington Post (September 




29. “The Runaway General,” 
Rolling Stone (June 22, 2010)
30. Luke Cohen, Joseph H. 
Felter, Radha K. Iyengar and 
Jacob Shapiro, “The Effect of 
Civilian Casualties in Afghanis-
tan and Iraq” (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Working Paper 





31. Graeme Smith, “Report 
Slams Tactic of Night Raids 
on Afghan Homes,” The Globe 
& Mail (December 28, 2008) 
at http://kaydka.com/Affart.
aspx?ida=1826&co=5&tr=193 
32. See Abdullah Obaidi, 
“Afghan Fury at Koran Burning 
Claims,” Institute for War & Peace 
Reporting (October 27, 2009) at 
http://www.atimes.com/ati-
mes/South_Asia/KJ28Df01.html 
33. Chris Floyd, “An Unaccusto-
med Truth: American Comman-
der Admits Afghan Atrocities,” 
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Various body counts of civilian Afghan casualties have been published.35 My numbers 
of such deaths began rising in 2006 as Table 2 documents. Afghan civilian casualties at 
the hands of the U.S and NATO steadily rose from 2005-2007.
Year Low count High count Mid-point
Air war Oct 7 - Dec 
9, 2001
2,569 2,949 2,759
Dec 10- 31st 116 116 116
Injured who later 
died, Oct-Dec 2001
640 796 718
2002 180 180 180
2003 64 64 64
2004 59 59 59
2005 59 71 65
2006 660 782 721
2007 1,010 1,297 1,154
2008 864 1,017 941
2009 926 1,077 1,002
2010 801 904 853
Cumulative 7,948 9,312 8,632
Table 1. Afghan Civilians Killed by Direct 
US/NATO Actions (impact deaths)
Note: the data omits most victims of 
the U.S drone strikes in the border 
region with Pakistan numbering close 
to 1,000 deaths.
The Afghan war of national liberation began in 2006. Very little data other than my 
own was published for the years prior to 2006, though some counts were made of the 
numbers killed during the early U.S. bombing campaign which I reviewed in August 
200236. Interestingly, a study employing a statistical population-based estimating pro-
cedure published in 2004 came to almost identical numbers as my own for the same 
time period37. Benini & Moulton calculated 3,994 civilians died from air and artillery 
bombardments, shooting, and other violence.  In other words, the Herold count of 
3,620 civilians killed by U.S. air and ground attacks alone is extremely close to the 
population-based estimate of Benini & Moulton.
The following Table 2 summarizes various counts of Afghan civilians killed by direct 
action (air and ground) by U.S and NATO forces from 2006 through the first ten 
months of 2010. The regular counts are mine and that by the UNAMA38. A main dif-
ference between the two is that the UNAMA refuses to publish disaggregated data and 
thereby prevents any fact-checking (or reproducing its data). We are simply asked to 
believe based upon faith39. In addition, since 2009, the UNAMA official in Kabul in 
charge of such data collection is Ms. Georgette Gagnon, who previously worked with 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), an organization bankrolled by George Soros and with 
a long, notorious history of over- counting deaths caused by U.S enemies and under-
counting those resulting from U.S actions (cases include Iraq in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, 
and Afghanistan during 2001-2007). UNAMA’s credibility as an impartial broker in 
Afghanistan is questioned by many in Kabul.  In general the UNAMA figures (which 
include deaths caused by Afghan army and police forces and well as foreign forces) cap-
ture a little over half those included in my count (except for 2008), all the while greatly 
exaggerating deaths caused by the Taliban. Human Rights Watch only published figures 
for 2006 and 200740. The Afghan Human Rights Monitor (ARM), an independent 
human rights organization based in Kabul also publishes counts.  A graphical summary 
of the Table 2 data is also included. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commis-
sion (AIHRC) publishes sporadic counts. NATO has reported data on civilians killed 
34. Jerome Starkey, “NATO’s 
Voice is Stifled as Propagan-
da Newspaper Ends Up as 
Food Wrapping,” Times Online 




35. see my “The Politics of 
Counting Dead Afghan Civilians: 
Responses by the Libertarian 
Right and Obama Liberals 
to McChrystal’s Numbers,” 





36. in my “Counting the Dead 
Attempts to hide the number 
of Afghan civilians killed by US 
bombs are an affront to justice,” 




37. Aldo A. Benini and Lawrence 
H. Moulton, “Civilian Victims 
in an Asymmetrical Conflict. 
Operation Enduring Freedom, 
Afghanistan,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, 4 (2004): 403-422. 
The Benini & Moulton study 
calculates civilian deaths from 
bombing, landmines, unex-
ploded ordnance strikes, from 
non-Western ground forces 
and should hence significantly 
exceed a count focused upon 
deaths directly caused by U.S. 
aerial bombing or ground 
attacks. The Benini & Moulton 
study based upon canvassing 
600 communities covers Sept-
ember 12, 2001 – June 20, 2002, 
whereas Herold covers October 
7, 2001 – July 31, 2002. Field 
staff visited all 600 communities 
directly affected by fighting 
(both airstrikes and ground 
combat). 
38. A summary of the UNAMA 
data made be found at 
“Afghanistan Civilian Casualties: 
Year by Year, Month by Month,” 





39. See my “One Month of 
the Obama Killing Machine 
in Afghanistan: Data and a 
Lesson for the UNAMA and Its 
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by NATO actions during 2008-2010, but the fi gures are not credible.41 For example, 
NATO stated that its forces killed 144 Afghan civilians in the fi rst ten months of 2009, 
and 160 during the same period in 201042. It baldly asserted that during Jan-Nov. 18th 
in 2010, 59 civilians were killed in air sorties (fi xed wing and helicopters), adding that 
“civilian deaths were down.” Naturally, this Pentagon “news” was relayed by the Associ-
ated Press and picked up by the Washington Post43. A quick glance at Table 2 reveals that 
to be utter nonsense. Th e well-known research organization, the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) released an academic report this year based upon declas-
sifi ed U.S. fi gures for Jan. 2009 – March 2010.44 It found 551 Afghan civilians being 
killed by U.S. forces, as compared to 1,195 in my data base; in other words, the U.S. 
“misses” over half those killed by its own actions.
Table 2. Various Counts of Afghan Civilian Casualties, 2006 - 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Herold1 721 1,153 941 1,012 853
HRW 230 434 - - -
UNAMA (230) 629 828 596 440
ARM - - 1,070 576 512
AIHRC - - - 283** 305**
NATO (Jan-Oct) - - - 144 160
NBER - - - 441 (551*) -
Notes: Herold, ARM and the NBER include only Afghan civilians killed by U.S and NATO militaries. Herold data is the 
midpoint between high and low counts. Human Rights Watch (HRW) counts Afghans killed by foreign forces. UNAMA, 
AIHRC and the ARM count Afghan civilians killed by pro-government forces which includes the Afghan army and police). 
NATO includes Afghan civilians killed by its own forces.
*the 551 figure is for January 2008 – March 2009, I have annualized the NBER data, meaning derived the figure for twelve 
months in 2009.
**for first 7 months in Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Civilian Casualty Figure: First Seven Months of 
2010” (Kabul: AIHRC, August 8, 2010) at http://www.aihrc.org.af/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/Thematic/Civilian_Casuali-
ties_Jan_Jul31_2010.pdf 
Groupies,” RAWA News (March 






40. In its Troops in Contact. 
Airstrikes and Civilian Casual-
ties in Afghanistan (New York: 




41. See my “The Pentagon’s 
Fantasy Numbers on Afghan 
Civilian Deaths,” Global Research 
(April 18, 2010) at http://
www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=18718 
42. The NATO report is dutifully 
transmitted by the Los Angeles 
Times in David S. Cloud, “Afghan 
Civilian Deaths Rise. U.S. 
statistics show an 11% increase 
this year in fatalities by Western 
forces,” Los Angeles Times 
(November 2, 2010). 
43. Deb Reichmann, “Coalition 
Ramps up Air War over Afgha-
nistan,” Associated Press (Novem-




44. Luke Cohen, Joseph H. Felter, 
Radha K. Iyengar and Jacob 
Shapiro, op.cit.
45. Spencer Ackerman, “Com-
mandos Hold Afghan Detainees 
in Secret Jails,” Wired.com (April 




46. Karen DeYoung and Greg 
Jaffe, “U.S. ‘Secret War’ Expands 
Globally as Special Opera-
tions Forces Take Larger Role,” 
Washington Post (June 4, 2010). 
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Afghan civilians today die primarily from aerial strikes (fixed wing, helicopters and 
drones) and helicopter-borne ground raids by secretive JSOC (Joint Special Operations 
Command) forces. The latter involve the notorious night-time assassination raids by 
Special Operations Forces and CIA units which are shrouded in deep secrecy and rarely 
get reported upon. JSOC also operates some 20 secret jails across Afghanistan.45 Under 
Obama such secret operations known in the military as “man hunters” have sharply 
increased46. The political usefulness is that such secret operations keep the American 
public in the dark. These CIA or Special Operations Force units in the infamous Project 
Phoenix mimic the CIA-trained Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) employed 
in Vietnam which murdered from 20-40,000 Vietnamese civilians47. Once in a while 
details emerge of the massacres perpetrated by such units, e.g., TF-373 comprised 
mostly of 7th Special Forces Group members is amply written up in the liberated 
WikiLeaks documents48. For example, on June 17, 2007, launched a mission 
…hundreds of miles south in Paktika province. The target was a notorious Libyan 
fighter, Abu Laith al-Libi. The unit was armed with a new weapon, known as Himars 
– High Mobility Artillery Rocket System – a pod of six missiles on the back of a 
small truck. The plan was to launch five rockets at targets in the village of Nangar 
Khel where TF 373 believed Libi was hiding and then to send in ground troops. 
The result was that they failed to find Libi but killed six Taliban fighters and then, 
when they approached the rubble of a madrasa, they found “initial assessment of 7 
x NC KIA” which translates as seven non-combatants killed in action. All of them 
were children. One of them was still alive in the rubble: “The Med TM immediately 
cleared debris from the mouth and performed CPR.” After 20 minutes, the child 
died49.
Another glimpse was provided when details leaked out about a US Special Forces 
assault on a party on February 12, 2010 that left a local district attorney, a local police 
commander and three Afghan women dead (a teenage girl and two of whom were preg-
nant)50. The U.S troops sealed-off the compound after the raid, extracted bullets from 
their victims and tried to cover-up the slaughter51. At first the U.S. military denied the 
killings but persistent reports in the British press – not the American media – eventually 
led to the admission. Dozens of other examples could be provided.
A Scottish aid worker, Linda Norgrove, was killed on October 8, 2010 by a U.S. Special 
Forces soldier, but the U.S. military initially blamed the death on her Taliban captors, 
even concocting lurid stories. Fifty-six Afghan children were killed in a midnight raid 
on April 9, 2009 by US/NATO forces after Obama became Commander-in-Chief52. 
Details on this deadly raid in a village west of Khost city may be found in The Afghan 
Victim Memorial Project data base53. 
As Obama’s Afghan “surge” unfolded, more fighting and more civilian deaths were 
certain (as well as renewed efforts by the United States to redefine, omit and suppress 
reporting upon such). The U.S. mainstream media has been mostly be a cooperative 
partner in the Pentagon’s news management, though of course exceptions exist (such 
examples are cited in footnotes, e.g., Gareth Porter, Glenn Greenwald, Chris Hedges, 
etc.). Many in Afghan see no realistic prospect for peace as long as foreign soldiers 
remain in Afghanistan and the Taliban have no incentive to compromise when they are 
in a winning position54. An additional 30,000 U.S troops – the Obama surge – means 
nothing in a country where military experts estimate that ~500,000 foreign soldiers 
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would be necessary to quell the resistance55. The simple truth is that the U.S/NATO 
like the Russians twenty years ago does not have a sufficient number of troops to hold 
territory56. As Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former ambassador to the USSR, put it, both 
invaders had tactics without strategy57.
While much continuity with Bush policies exists, some opportunistic changes in the 
execution of the Afghan war have been made by Obama. Most are inspired by the aim 
to better market/spin “the good war” to the American public58 and especially to Euro-
pean publics. For example, under McChrystal U.S/NATO forces were relying less upon 
deadly air strikes which are 4-10 times more deadly for Afghan civilians than are ground 
attacks59. As a consequence, the monthly total of Afghan civilians killed by US/NATO 
action declined moderately at the same time as the monthly death toll of occupation 
forces rose (Table 3). U.S occupation troop deaths from hostile action have soared since 
2007: 2007, 83; 2008, 133; 2009, 268 and in 2010, 44060.
Table 3. Monthly Fatalities of Afghan Civilians (killed by US/NATO) Action and of Foreign Occupation 
Troops’ Hostile Fatalities Involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2008 – December 2010
Sources: Afghan civilians from my Afghan Victim Memorial Project data base and foreign occupation 
troop fatalities from ICasualties.org at http://www.icasualties.org/oef/ 
(1) Afghan Civilian Deaths (2) US/NATO troop deaths Ratio of (1)/(2)
October 2008 91-97 18 5.1-5.4
November 2008 95-138 12 7.9-11.5
December 2008 41 26 1.6
January 2009 112-120 21 5.3-5.7
February 2009 50 24 2.1
March 2009 36 25 1.4
April 2009 77-82 10 6.4-8.2
May 2009 147-220 23 6.4-9.6
June 2009 109-133 33 3.3-4.0
July 2009 47-56 65 0.7-0.9
August 2009 64-66 72 0.9-1.1
September 2009 99-118 61 1.6-1.9
October 2009 62-69 61 1.0-1.1
November 2009 66 29 2.3
December 2009 57-61 32 1.8-1.9
January 2010 72 39 1.8
February 2010 82-88 50 1.6-1.8
March 2010 28-39 35 0.8-1.1
April 2010 30-35 28 1.1-1.3
May 2010 40-47 47 0.9-1.0
June 2010 68-98 84 0.8-1.2
July 2010 55-61 75 0.7-0.8
August 2010 82-89 75 1.1-1.2
September 2010 78-86 46 1.7-1.9
October 2010 149-165 63 2.4-2.6
November  2010 54-61 51 1.1-1.2
December 2010 63-65 39 1.6-1.7
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As a result, the ratio of Afghan civilians killed per occupation soldier death - a measure/
metric of the lethality of America’s Afghan war for Afghan civilians relative to that for 
US/NATO occupation troops - has been falling from above 5 during late 2008 to 
about 1.3 during March 2009. In 2008, this ratio was 2.9-3.5; 4.4-5.6 in 2007; and 
3.4-4.0 in 200661. When McChrystal took over the ratio fell to under 1, however when 
Petreaus replaced McChrystal the ratio quickly moved above 1. Combating the Afghan 
resistance with traditional ground operations is simply much more dangerous for for-
eign forces than relying upon the more deadly air strikes and night-time assassination 
raids, both of which have soared under Petreaus. The data for September and October 
2010 is grossly underestimated insofar as many civilians killed by U.S. Marines who 
have replaced the British in the Sangin area of Helmand have not been reported upon 
though local villagers complain bitterly about such deaths62. 
Petraeus has discarded the winning-hearts-and-minds counterinsurgency (COIN) 
approach, replacing it with a deadly trio of blunt force killing – air strikes, drones and 
Special Operations midnight raids63. Such is hardly surprising as when Petraeus took over 
in Iraq (January 2007 until September 2008) monthly civilian deaths caused by U.S/
NATO actions doubled64. Night raids by U.S Special Operations’ forces have risen now 
to about 200 a month, a five-fold rise since 200965. In 2010, the rate of drone strikes 
in Pakistan rose seven-fold over 200966. According to Pakistani authorities, 708 people 
were killed in 51 drone strikes during 2009. The toll for nine months in 2010 has been 
600 or more in 75 strikes67. Countless civilians are slaughtered because drone operators 
in Nevada and Florida often cannot distinguish clearly between “insurgents” and civil-
ians68. If drones now even kill U.S. Marines, one can only wonder about the carnage 
perpetrated upon Afghan and Pashtun civilians69. Drone strikes’ remain shrouded in 
official secrecy70. U.S. counterinsurgency experts, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 
also cite the 700 figure71. Moreover, a strong case can be that besides further fuelling 
the Af-Pak resistance by producing enormously high levels of anger and rage against 
the United States” as even recognized by Kilcullen and Exum72, by the standards of 
international law, drone warfare is illegal73. 
Obama stated that US/NATO forces in Afghanistan were wagers of peace74. America’s 
propaganda ministers and generals cover-up that the Taliban & Co. are winning in 
Afghanistan75. Neil Faulkner editor of Military Times magazine interpreted the battle 
of Marjah in Helmand province,
In reality, Marjah is a vaguely-defined area of villages, markets and family com-
pounds. If there are tens of thousands of people, they are spread across 125 sq miles. 
Marjah was invented because a military operation has to have a clear-cut goal to be 
deemed a victory. President Obama had doubled the total US troop deployment, but 
public support was waning. The generals needed a victory, so they created Marjah 
and planned Operation Moshtarak to capture it. A phantom city was needed because 
the enemy is a phantom. A task force is assembled and motors into bandit country. 
If it is too small, it risks annihilation. If it is too big, it finds itself punching the air. 
A golden rule of guerrilla warfare is that you fight only if you are certain to win. So 
the invaders of Afghanistan are waging a war against an enemy who is never there. 
“Suppose we were (as we might be),” wrote T. E. Lawrence, “an influence, an idea, 
a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? 
Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to 
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the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed... Ours should be a war of 
detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast, unknown 
desert ...”76.
Powerful parallels exist between the US/NATO offensives in Helmand and Kandahar 
now with that of the Soviets in the Panjshir valley in 1982. As the veteran international 
journalist and writer Edward Girardet noted, during the 1980s
The Soviets thought they could subdue Afghanistan through brute force, political 
indoctrination, and bribes. They wanted to put across the notion that their form 
of government had far more to offer than the jihad embraced by the mujahideen. 
They lost77. 
The much heralded battle of Kandahar promised to be more of the same.
How pathetic to hear U.S. troops whine that the Taliban are too weak to engage foreign 
forces in a conventional, manly manner and then trumpet loudly that in every pitched 
battle the Taliban are soundly defeated. Yet, Afghanistan is more dangerous now than it 
has ever been during the American war according to international organizations and 
humanitarian groups78. Faced with superior force, the resistance simply melts away and 
then returns when the foreign occupation forces withdraw79.
The Taliban have five aces in their hand: (1) a rugged territory which they know like the 
palm of a hand; (2) the Afghan hatred of foreign domination (not the West); (3) the 
Afghan belief in taking revenge for a misdeed wrought upon a person’s honor (especially 
family members); and time). Fourth, William Polk argues that the U.S/NATO display a 
profound misunderstanding of Afghan socio-political realities80 which plays into Taliban 
hands. Polk points to the unique Afghan style of governance, the Afghan understanding 
of foreign civic action programs (whether Soviet or American), and Afghans’ virulent 
rejection of a foreign-imposed, corrupt minority regime. Fifth, unlike the U.S military 
which requires about 7 to 8 support personnel for every combat soldier, the Taliban 
travel lightly and are extremely mobile. The Taliban are widely recognized to have been 
able to restore security to the areas under their control, as stated by a resident of Bala 
Murgab to a Spanish journalist,
We all know that the Taliban do bad things, that sometimes they’re cruel, but since 
they arrived in our village, we sleep with the doors open with no fear of being killed 
or robbed. And that is much more than the government and the foreigners have 
done for us81.
The situation is far worse as many “…villagers see the foreigners as the main source 
of insecurity: the presence of foreign troops means IEDs, ambushes and airstrikes…” 
in the words of a long-time Afghan scholar82. As Patrick Coburn reports, “One hears 
again and again Afghans saying that the Taliban may not be liked but that the US is 
distrusted, even hated”83.
The Taliban’s strategy is to spread out foreign occupation forces across space – the Tali-
ban now have a presence in the north (Kunduz) and in the west (Farah); (1) to lengthen 
U.S supply lines making them vulnerable; (2) to create just enough uncertainty and 
danger across Afghanistan so as to prevent any reconstruction; and (3) to kill as many 
foreigners as possible by primarily using IEDs and suicide attacks. On each count, the 
Taliban is succeeding. For example, as the American war drags on, the following graph 
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bat from 2004 to 200984. As the countryside became more dangerous, supplies have 
been increasingly air dropped (the number of airdrops rose from 99 in 2005 to 800 in 
2008)85. Most recently, the U.S military itself conceded that violence across Afghanistan 
was at an all-time high and that the insurgency’s geographic reach and sophistication had 
grown (curiously adding that “security was slowly spreading across the country”)86. By 
late 2008, Taliban IEDs were already effective at disabling America’s new Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles87. 
A map produced by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) 
released on September 10, 2009, showed substantial Taliban activity in 97% of Afghani-
stan, compared to 72% in 2008 and 54% in 2007.88 A concrete example is Chak in 
Wardak province, a scant 40 miles west of Kabul where three years ago the Taliban con-
trolled the district was restricted to the hours of darkness whereas now, as the indepen-
dent reporter James Ferguson, tells us the Taliban rule day and night89. Already in late 
2008, the independent journalist, Nir Rosen who had travelled widely in Afghanistan, 
noted that “once you leave Kabul, you’re entering Taliban territory”90. A recent report 
by aid agencies working in Afghanistan also emphasizes growing insecurity and soaring 
civilian casualties91. A marvelous account of what Taliban-controlled Afghanistan looks 
like now and what it will look like in the future after the occupation has been provided 
by The Guardian’s Ghaith Abdul-Ahad92.
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The Spread of Combat in Afghanistan 
and Areas under Taliban Control
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Obama/Pentagon Efforts at Controlling the Narrative of America’s 
Afghan War
“This is all a war of perceptions” – General Stanley McChrystal93
How does the American government seek to set the war narrative?94. First by spend-
ing billions on propaganda. During 2004-2009 the Pentagon’s annual public relations 
budget increased by 63% to over $4.7 billion95. For example, at an abandoned Air Force 
base in San Antonio (TX), the Pentagon’s “Hometown News” organization publishes 
glowing stories about the military. In 2009, it planned to put out 5,400opress releases, 
3,000 television releases and 1,600 radio interviews – 50% more than in 2007. Some 
~$500 million is spent for “psychological operations” targeting foreign audiences. In 
Afghanistan, funds are being spent to train Afghan journalists to engage in “responsible 
journalism.” Under the Obama clock, the efforts expended to manage the news com-
ing out from Afghanistan - or to spin the war - have soared as compared to during the 
administration of his predecessor96. Most of the press is content to simply parrot the 
releases and statements made by US military spokespersons97. The U.S. military is more 
than willing to physically silence oppositional media, as for example with the bombing 
in April 1999 of Serbia’s State Television and Radio Station building (killing 16 civilians 
and wounding another 16) and two years later bombing the Al Jazeera office in Kabul 
in November 200198. As regards combat reporting, the Pentagon profiles reporters, 
accepting as “embeds” only those deemed by the military as being neutral or positive99. 
The U.S military has also fine-tuned its procedure dealing with Afghan civilians they 
kill: first say nothing; then when reports being presenting compelling evidence, deny; 
when  more evidence surfaces about civilians dying  which cannot be denied, blame 
the Taliban for the deaths: finally when the presented evidence mounts, minimize the 
numbers killed —as for example in the August 2009 massacre in Azizabad where the 
Pentagon initially reported the U.S airstrike killed 5 Afghan civilians, not the close to 
100100— and promise an investigation (carried out of course by themselves). 
A typical example of Pentagon and official U.S mainstream failing to report a U.S attack 
which resulted in civilian casualties was revealed in recently liberated documents by 
WikiLeaks. A British Guardian report described a midnight raid by Special Forces upon 
Jaldak, south of Qalat in Zabul Province. The early hour raid resulted in five dead males: 
an 80-yr old, a 70-yr old, a 30-yr old, a 20-yr old and an 18-yr old, leaving the family 
without any males101. The Jaldak elders maintain the innocence of the dead and three 
detained, to the point that they refused to bury the bodies and threatened to display 
them on Highway 1. At the time, the U.S. military issued a news report mentioning 
that it had killed “five insurgents in a raid in the restive south” in Zabul Province. The 
report noted that “having moved the women and children to safety, the force entered 
the buildings, killing five armed militants ….” as relayed by the Agence France-Presse in 
a wire report of January 9, 2009102. A search of Lexis-Nexis reveals one other mention 
of the Zabul operation. Xinhua General News Service quoted local officials in Zabul who 
stated that five civilians from one family were killed in a raid by international forces 
in the wee-hours of Friday103. Countless similar examples are presented in my Afghan 
Victim Memorial Project data base. Wikileaks’ liberated war logs document many cases 
of how the U.S. military sanitized records of bloodbaths104.
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Contrary to U.S. military thinking which asserts that “the press heavily reports on civil-
ian casualty incidents…civilian casualty incidents are highly ‘mediagenic’,”105 a history 
exists of mainstream U.S media being megaphones for the Pentagon, e.g., Laura King 
of the Associated Press and the Los Angeles Times being a case in point106. I have pro-
vided a concrete case study of how the mainstream engaged in immaculate deception 
about the killing of Afghan civilians on March 24, 2010 and November 23, 2001, in 
Chagoti Ghar, Khost province107.
Three main subterfuges have been used by the U.S and NATO militaries, the compli-
ant corporate media and organizations like Human Rights Watch, to excuse the killing 
and wounding of innocent Afghan civilians. The first is to express righteous anger over 
“them” killing civilians intentionally whereas “we” never intentionally target civilians. 
The second is to assert that the dastardly Taliban and their associates employ civilians 
as human shields. A third means used by the Pentagon and compliant U.S mainstream 
media has been to simply omit whenever possible written reports and especially photos 
of the victims of U.S/NATO military actions (as below), all the while amply publishing 
stories and photos of Afghan civilians killed by IED’s or suicide bombers (good bodies). 
In other words, as pointed out long ago by Edward Herman there are good bodies and 
bad bodies in America’s wars108.
The intentionality argument is often couched in the language of justifiable collateral 
damage, regrettable but necessary. Since the killing was collateral, it cannot be inten-
tional goes the story. Least-cost considerations (in terms of U.S. military deaths and 
U.S. dollars) by the US and NATO militaries directly translates into tens of thousands 
of Afghan civilian casualties. How? During the initial phases of the U.S. bombing 
campaign but still today, U.S. warplanes dropped powerful bombs in civilian-rich areas 
with little concern for Afghan civilians. Today, the aerial bombing is more related to 
close air support called-in by ground forces as a means to defeat the enemy without 
having to fight him on the ground and likely suffer casualties. The killing of civilians 
by the United States has long been excused away as “tragic errors.” More significantly, 
a new term was coined around 1990, collateral damage (which was linked to uninten-
tional), which soon became an essential part of the U.S war narrative. The U.S/NATO 
war managers dredge out the tired old “intent” argument. As Edward Herman noted, 
…it is claimed by the war managers that these deaths and injuries are not deliberate, 
but are only “collateral” to another end, they are treated by the mainstream media, 
NGOs, new humanitarians, and others as a lesser evil than cases where civilians are 
openly targeted. But this differential treatment is a fraud, even if we accept the some-
times disputable claim of inadvertence (occasionally even acknowledged by officials 
to be false, as described below). Even if not the explicit target, if collateral civilian 
deaths are highly probable and statistically predictable they are clearly acceptable and 
intentional. If in 500 raids on Afghan villages alleged to harbor al Qaeda cadres it is 
likely that civilians will die in 450 of them, those deaths are an integral component 
of the plan and the clear responsibility of the planners and executioners. As law 
professor Michael Tonry has said, “In the criminal law, purpose and knowledge are 
equally culpable states of mind109.  
Aerial bombing in the name of liberating Afghans will continue with little regard 
for Afghan civilians who for the Western politico-military elites (and general public) 
remain simply invisible in the empty space which is an “increasingly aerially occupied 
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Afghanistan”110. The compliant mainstream media perpetuates the myth by serving as 
stenographer of the Pentagon’s virtual reality. When details of Afghan civilian deaths do 
leak through the US/NATO news management efforts, a Lt. Colonel at Bagram offers 
“sincere regrets” or the promise of an investigation and by tomorrow all is forgotten. 
They are, after all, just Afghans “we” killed. Theirs are bad bodies, not good bodies. 
A myth has circulated since the beginning of the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghani-
stan in October 2001. The myth is endlessly repeated by the U.S. occupation forces, 
corporate media, the Pentagon, defense intellectual pundits, the Cruise Missile Left, the 
humanitarian interventionists, and even some in the United Nations: Afghan insurgents 
hide amongst civilians whom they use as human shields. To begin with, the assertion is 
never empirically documented but just merely stated as a self-evident truth. Secondly, 
the implication is that an insurgent or Taliban fighter, resisting the U.S./NATO inva-
sion should stand alone on a mountain ridge, his AK-47 raised to the sky, and engage 
in a “fair” act of war with an Apache attack helicopter or A-10 Warthog and see who 
prevails.  Thirdly, what is conveniently omitted is that the insurgents have lived in the 
area, have friends and families in the communities, and that such a local support base 
is precisely what gives a guerrilla insurgency (along with knowledge of the local terrain) 
its classic advantage. Such local connection means that the insurgents will (unlike the 
US/NATO occupation forces) go to great lengths to not put local people in danger.
Time magazine produced a strong, timely piece of gruesome propaganda when it put 
the face of a young Afghan girl with her nose cut off “by the Taliban” on its magazine 
cover. At the time, the Taliban denied having done so, but the mainstream media 
ignored the denial. We now know that the girl was punished by her father for running 
away from her abusive husband numerous times, as reported by the independent Afghan 
Independent Human Rights Commission111. Any retraction from the likes of Time, the 
Associated Press, the Washington Post, etc.? Of course not.
The mainstream war narrative directed at Euro-American public resembles a sea of lies: 
Obama’s mega and mini lies, NATO lies, UNAMA lies, NBER academic lies, Associ-
ated Press lies112, mainstream media lies, and Lara Logan (of CBS 60 Minutes) lies. The 
sea is stocked with lies of omission and of commission employed to construct the war 
narrative. A sample listing of news as instruction not information follows though each 
merits an extended discussion:
 ● Announcing the killing of “important” Taliban or Al Qaeda leader alleged to have 
been eliminated by a drone in the Af-Pak border region but who then resurface weeks 
or months later (the multiple lives of resistance leaders113;
 ● Announcing with great fanfare the capture of “Taliban,” who are then soon 
released, e.g., Petraeus’ captured ‘Taliban” have been over 80% civilian114. But this 
now intentional as US night raids are aimed at Afghan civilians (who are held briefly 
in order to extract information)115;
 ● Proclaiming victory in taking over (the fictional) city of Marjah a success then116 and 
Kandahar now and so many other futile “surges” during the past nine years (of areas 
allegedly cleared but which are then re-occupied by the Taliban)117;
 ● Misrepresenting U.S human cost of war (let alone the carnage in Afghanistan) by 
hiring mercenaries (including a staggering number of private contractors- by late 
2009, 64,000 U.S troops and 104,000 contractors shared the Afghan battlefield, the 
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highest ratio of contractors to military personnel in U.S. history118 and Green Card 
soldiers119), outsourcing combat to lackey nations (e.g., most recently Slovakia, Czech 
Republic even Mongolia120);
 ● Enemy body counts bearing no connection with reality solemnly proclaimed at 
Bagram or in Kabul reminiscent of Saigon’s “Five O’clock Follies”121;
 ● Widespread torture and secret imprisonment (see Omar Khadr case) with impunity; 
somehow the CIA torture tapes just disappeared and no one is held accountable); 
far less transparency at Obama’s secret penal colony, Bagram, and hidden CIA bases 
in Afghanistan where torture was routine122.  Bagram prison has been massively 
enlarged under Obama and represents a black hole where “illegal enemy combatants” 
are incarcerated, cannot see lawyers, have no trials and never see any evidence there 
may be against them123. The U.S. continues to transfer persons picked up in raids to 
the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), widely acknowledged to engage 
in vicious torture124; 
 ● U.S. abuse of detainees has been routine at Afghanistan bases125;
 ● Hiding the fact that all too many US soldiers from General “mad dog” Mattis who 
famously proclaimed he enjoyed killing126 to the Stryker Brigade boys who  took 
photos posing with dead Afghan civilians127 to the US Army Green Beret who shot 
an Afghan and cut off his ear as a trophy128, and the trigger-happy helicopter pilots, 
enjoy killing enemy Afghans; 
 ● Massive Pentagon propaganda effort to magnify or invent civilian deaths caused by 
resistance side and to completely suppress reports of those killed by US/NATO forces;
 ● Trumpeting on-going discussions with “moderate” Taliban (these Taliban are 
ex-Taliban now dimly viewed by the fighting Taliban) when the real Taliban have 
repeatedly stated that no negotiations will take as long as Afghanistan is an occupied 
country;
 ● The assiduous use of language to sell war (e.g., the resistance is terrorism), foreign 
peacemaking forces not occupation forces, etc.;
 ● Pursuing government secrecy with a zeal greater than even George W. Bush129;
 ● Hotel journalism versus that by real independent, un-embedded journalists 
like Jerome Starkey (The Times), Chris Sands (The National), David Lindorff 
(CounterPunch), Ghaith Abdul-Ahad (The Guardian), John Pilger, or James Ferguson 
(The Independent).  An important element used by the US/ NATO militaries is to rely 
upon embedded journalists who provide accounts favorable to these militaries (this is 
NOT independent journalism). A favorite example of such an embedded mouthpiece 
for the US military is CBS’s 60 minutes’ Lara Logan, a great fan (nay, groupie) of U.S 
Special Forces who make the news lady breathless130. Other stellar exemplars of such 
toady journalists are Laura King and Jason Strasziuso;
 ● The American media regularly offers the pabulum that the Taliban are a few 
dollars a-day rented fighters when the truth is that they are a disciplined, well-trained 
and equipped fighting force focused upon seizing power either by conquest or by 
negotiation131;
 ● Failing to note that there are now at best 50-100 Al Qaeda  cadres/fighters in all of 
Afghanistan132;
 ● The different ways in which the American media and the European media reported 
upon the massive trove of information released by WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010. Lara 
Logan of CBS focused only upon atrocities committed by the Taliban, which amounts 
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to propaganda not journalism133. As expected, the New York Times selectively reported 
on WikiLeaks documents134; 
 ● And generally, a discourse about politics as a Debordian spectacle135. A total 
disconnect exists between reality in Afghanistan and what Obama/the Pentagon 
“instruct” the America public, e.g., most recently the Obama war “review” noting 
“signs of progress” . As Floyd pointed out, a striking inversion is at work: the very 
success of the Afghan resistance, its fierceness is evidence of their desperation, their 
ultimate and imminent collapse136. 
The vehemence with which the Obama administration seeks to control the war narrative 
is revealed by the fierce reaction to the posting by WikiLeaks of internal war documents.
Each of these warrants extended discussion. Let me focus upon images and language 
in service of America’s war. Western mainstream press delights in printing photos of 
civilians especially children hurt or killed by Taliban attacks as for example the one 
below from Yahoo!News. But do we ever see photos of the victims of US/NATO attacks? 
Of course not even though such photos are taken and posted outside the U.S. (as for 
example in my data base containing over 1,000 photos of Afghanistan under US bomb-
ing and occupation).
Headline: “Wounded Afghan boy lies on hospital bed”
A wounded Afghan boy lies on a hospital bed in the Emam Sehab 
district of Kunduz province November 13, 2010. A bomb hidden on a 
motorcycle killed at least eight civilians and wounded 18 in northern 
Kunduz province, a district official said. The bomb apparently targeted 
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lished in America as they depict “bad bodies” which might make the public uncom-
fortable.137 Analysis of mainstream U.S. news-magazine photo coverage during the 
early years of the Afghan conflict clearly revealed that the printed photographs offered 
prompts for the prevailing government version of events, e.g., our troops don’t kill and 
maim.138
Headline: “U.S Special Forces brutally kill 10 Afghan civilians in Narang district”
On Dec.27, 2009, at around 2:30 of mid night, US Special Forces raided Ghazi Khan Ghondi village of 
Narang District in Kunar province of Afghanistan. They enter the civilian houses and kill ten civilians, 
among them eight were school boys, one a poor farmer and a 12-year-old rancher. They all have been shot 
in the head. Although the US occupation forces denied any involvement, but Kai Eide, special UN repre-
sentative announced in a press conference that the “international forces” were engaged in the incident and 
“a preliminary United Nations investigation has found that eight students were among 10 Afghan civilians 
killed in Kunar province.” Further photos and details at “US Special Forces Brutally Kill 10 Afghan Civilians in 
Narang – Photo Gallery,” RAWA (January 2, 2010) at http://www.uruknet.info/?p=61746 
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Language is selectively employed to construct the Obama, Pentagon, mainstream media 
war narrative. Almost every wire service report by the Associated Press includes “…the 
Taliban regularly exaggerate casualties caused by their attacks.” A festival of Orwellian 
language is deployed by the Pentagon and Commander-in-Chief Obama. Obama 
was described as engaging in “Operation Redefinition” (by Jon Stewart on March 31, 
2009139). Obama simply redefines the old Bush policies and tactics in Afghanistan 
which largely remain in place.
On December 3, 2010, redefinition was upped another notch by Obama who snuck 
into Afghanistan for a four-hour secret visit at the U.S. base, Bagram, where clad in a 
bomber jacket he proclaimed the U.S. was winning the war, amidst overwhelming con-
trary evidence. Losing is winning and U.S. troops in Afghanistan are in ObamaSpeak 
“wagers of peace.”
The war narrative regularly employs such phrases as “Taliban infested area” (why not 
rewrite as “foreign occupation force infested area”?). The use of the word “terrorist” 
for a military opponent is systematic, as is use of the adjective “peacekeeping” or far 
worse Obama’s “wagers of peace”  instead of occupation forces. Combat troop increases 
are now labeled under Pentagon-Speak as “combat enablers.”140 When a US/NATO 
helicopter is shot down the narrative is a helicopter made a “hard landing”, instead of 
being shot down. Media spokespersons from the opposing warring side are identified 
differently: a Taliban “mouthpiece” versus a “NATO spokesman.” The persons fighting 
the foreign invaders are “terrorists” not resistance fighters though of course in 1980’s 
the Afghans fighting the Russian invader were called “freedom fighters.” 
The usual western mantra is “The Taliban often exaggerates the details of attacks and 
play down the numbers of their own casualties.”141 But let’s rewrite the above substitut-
ing Americans/NATO for Taliban.
Another standard mantra is the “Insurgents continue their indiscriminate killing and 
wounding of innocent civilians despite their leaderships guidance,” said U.S. Army Col. 
Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint 
Operations Center director. “Our thoughts and concerns are with the families during 
this difficult time.” As Afghan civilian deaths rose, the U.S/NATO say, “…Sorry.”142 
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Conclusion: The Politics of What Matters and Where
William Dalrymple argues the comparison of Afghanistan today is less with Vietnam 
and more with Great Britain’s Great Game of 1839-42143. In the end, the main deter-
minant of the course of America’s Afghan war will be bodies. The increasing number 
of Afghan bodies matters and fuels the resistance, resulting in what Anatol Lieven of 
King’s College (London) aptly observed, Afghanistan 
“is becoming a sort of surreal hunting estate, in which the U.S. and NATO breed 
the very terrorists they then track down”144. 
Space does not allow an elaboration here, that the U.S attack upon and later occupa-
tion of Afghanistan in response to 9/11 terrorist attack was hoped-for by Al Qaeda 
as it would cause a worldwide Muslim backlash as detailed in Syed Saleem Shahzad’s 
authoritative book, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, published in May 2011145. 
The American public (except for the old left, the Unitarians and Quakers, a couple 
other progressive churches, folks at the Brave New Foundation, the peace movement, 
RAWA’s American supporters, and many on the libertarian Right146) does not (and has 
never) care(d) about civilians killed by US military. But for liberals, Obama can do no 
wrong147. They only care about U.S troop deaths. G.W Bush knew this early on – see 
his banning of photos of dead U.S. military personnel at Dover Air Base. Official U.S 
military bodies (killed or injured) matter in the United States. Afghan bodies count for 
nothing with the American general public. Every effort will be undertaken by Obama/
Pentagon to minimize US domestic political opposition to foreign war-making. This 
began in the post-Vietnam era with the shift from a drafted army to one relying upon 
professional “volunteers,” who represent a narrow sliver of the country’s population. 
In recent mid-term elections in the United States, only 6.5% of voters mentioned the 
Afghan war as being of concern.
It’s all about controlling the US war narrative, something very different from the truth. 
A first successful ploy was to entice the NATO countries into fighting in Afghanistan in 
2004. The count of war dead by nationality showed that NATO stalwarts like Britain, 
Canada and Holland did a disproportionate amount of the heavy lifting. Some NATO 
countries understood the ploy and limited their contribution to non-fighting areas at the 
time, e.g., Germany and Spain. But as the war grinded on and NATO country publics 
turned decidedly against it, Bush first and Obama later sought creative new ways to 
minimize officially acknowledged U.S. military casualties. Such measures included: 
escalating reliance upon private contractors (privatizing American war-making) and 
assorted Rambos under Obama148 (de facto mercenaries); ramping up the use Green 
Card soldiers; and begging for troops from other nations. The use of contractors is 
especially convenient as these are not reported as U.S. military casualties and are outside 
any public scrutiny, a deliberate ploy to hide the costs of war149.
The mainstream war narrative directed at Euro-American public resembles a sea of 
lies: Obama’s mega and mini lies, NATO lies, UNAMA lies, NBER academic lies, 
Associated Press lies150, mainstream media lies, and Lara Logan (of CBS 60 Minutes) 
lies. The sea is stocked with lies of omission and of commission employed to construct 
the war narrative.
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Most twentieth century counterinsurgency wars have failed (the two exceptions being 
the Americans in the Philippines and the British in Malaya). The resistance wins because 
it knows the home territory and the invader cannot overcome the “foreign invader” 
label.151 History carries some potent lessons. 
General Sergei Akhromeyev, commander of the Soviet armed forces, address(ed) the 
Soviet Politburo in 1986. “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been 
occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another. Nevertheless much of the 
territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centres, but we 
cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize.”… General Akhromeyev 
demanded extra troops – or the war in Afghanistan would continue “for a very, very 
long time”. And how’s this for a quotation from, say, a British or US commander in 
Helmand today? “Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely 
in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value 
in such a vast land where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills.” Yes, of 
course, this was Gen Akhromeyev in 1986152.
The American war in Afghanistan will end after NATO country militaries withdraw. 
This process began with the Dutch in 2010, the Canadians in 2011 and will accelerate 
in 2011. The Germans have now announced an exit date for 2011153. No amount of 
purchased or bribed Croatian, Mongolian, Lithuanian, Georgian and other such troops 
can replace the old NATO contingents.
In the end, bodies tell the story, America’s lost war in Afghanistan will cease, cut by the 
scissors of Afghan bodies and mounting U.S. military bodies (Figure 1).  
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